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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study university admissions under a cen-
tralized system that uses grades and standardized test scores
to match applicants to university programs. We consider af-
firmative action policies that seek to increase the number of
admitted applicants from underrepresented groups. Since
such a policy has to be announced before the start of the
application period, there is uncertainty about the score dis-
tribution of the students applying to each program. This
poses a difficult challenge for policy-makers. We explore the
possibility of using a predictive model trained on historical
data to help optimize the parameters of such policies.
1. INTRODUCTION
In centralized university admission systems, students submit
their applications to a central institution, which matches the
applicants with the programs offered by various universities.
This matching is typically automated through an algorithm
and based on grades and standardized test scores. As grades
and test scores tend to differ across demographic groups (see,
e.g., [2, 15, 18, 19]), this kind of system can lead to large
gaps in admission rates between groups. These gaps can be
reduced through affirmative action policies, which are chal-
lenging to design. First, such policies should reward merit
and lead to the admission of the best applicants. Second,
policies should be announced before the application period
begins to provide candidates with all the information they
need. Computational methods can be leveraged to evalu-
ate a large range of alternatives, much more than can be
evaluated manually, and identify effective policies.
In this paper, we develop an approach for designing robust
and effective affirmative action policies for university ad-
missions. We consider bonus policies, i.e., policies that add
a number of bonus points to the scores of applicants from
disadvantaged backgrounds. These policies do not alter the
admission priority of applicants within each group, and have
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equivalent effects to setting admission quotas [14]. The tech-
nical problem we face is to choose the right number of bonus
points so that the policy will have a consistently beneficial
effect on the admission rate of the given group.
Related Work
Using the terminology of Friedler et al. [9], our work and
affirmative action more generally are consistent with the we
are all equal (WAE) worldview. According to WAE, higher
grades do not necessarily imply more talent or more dili-
gence, but are seen as a product of structural inequality
(e.g., lack of resources for subgroups of the student popu-
lation [8]). Affirmative action policies (e.g., bonus policies)
are thus implemented as a way to counter the effect of in-
equalities being reinforced through – in our case – unequal
grade and test score distributions. The beneficial effects
of affirmative action policies on disadvantaged groups have
both been shown in studies based on real-world implemen-
tations of specific policies (e.g., [5, 6]) and in laboratory
settings (e.g., [3]). Other studies discuss how different types
of affirmative action policies can be incorporated into the
algorithm that matches students with university programs
(see, e.g., [1, 10, 11]). However, existing literature lacks a
discussion of how the numerical parameters in these policies
(e.g., the number of bonus points given to an underrepre-
sented group) affect the resulting matching. The usage of
computational methods in policy design has, for example,
already been researched in the fields of public health [4] or
counter-terrorism [12, 16]. In the area of university admis-
sions, recent work [14] addressed the problem of the design
of affirmative action policies. However, the study designed
policies for a given set of applications and not under un-
certainty. To our knowledge, this is the first study that
discusses how historical data can be leveraged in the design
of affirmative action policies for university admissions when
the applicants are unknown.
2. DATASET
We analyze data from the university admission system of
Chile, which contains information on all applicants and uni-
versity programs between 2004 and 2017. For 2017, this
amounts to 60 000 students and about 1 500 programs.
After taking standardized tests and obtaining their scores,
students submit their preferences as a ranked list of up to
ten programs. Students are admitted to programs accord-
ing to an admission score, which is a weighted average of
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Figure 1: Distributions of grades and standardized test
scores for different income levels.
high school grades and test scores – with different weights
used by different programs. The data contains these high
school grades, test scores, and applicant preferences. It also
includes a (binary) gender variable as well as the house-
hold income and size. We binarize the student’s income as
low-income (bottom five household-income-per-household-
member deciles), and high-income (top five deciles).
Differences in scores and preferences. According to
statistics of the year 2016, with similar observations for
other years, we find that there is a pronounced difference
between the score distributions of different income groups:
high-income students have slightly higher high school grades
than low-income students, and much higher scores across all
standardized tests (Figure 1). While there exist differences
between genders, too, they are less pronounced in the data.
We also observe differences in the programs to which stu-
dents apply. To describe these differences, we define the
prestige of a program as the average score of its admitted
students in the previous three years. We find that high-
income students express preference for programs of higher
average prestige compared to low-income students, partic-
ularly in their first preference (Figure 2). The difference
can largely be attributed to the different scores of the two
groups (Figure 1) – once we control for admission scores, the
differences mostly disappear (figure omitted for brevity).
Differences in admission rates. To measure differences
in admission rates, we use the Statistical Parity Difference
(SPD) measure:
P (Y = 1|A = a)− P (Y = 1|A 6= a), (1)
where Y = 1 indicates being admitted into a program, A
is a sensitive attribute, and a marks a demographic group
(in this work either low-income or female students). Low
absolute values of SPD are desired – and perfect equality
is achieved for a value of 0. Following thresholds provided
in tools for measuring algorithmic bias [17], we accept val-
ues inside [−0.1, 0.1] and reject values outside of this range
as strongly unequal. As shown in Figure 3, we tend to mea-
sure larger negative SPD values for the more prestigious pro-
Figure 2: Average prestige of students’ preferences across
income levels.
Figure 3: Distribution of SPD for income. Programs are
ranked by prestige (higher to lower); x-axis indicates pro-
gram ranks in each bin; crosses mark the means.
grams, indicating differences in admission rates that place
low-income students at a disadvantage.
Variance in admission rates across years. We seek to
bring the SPD of programs closer to zero, which is chal-
lenging because while the share of programs with strongly
unequal admission rates is fairly constant across years, there
is large variation in the SPD of individual programs over the
years. In fact, we found that the SPD of one program in one
year is a worse predictor for its SPD in the next year than
simply predicting an SPD of 0. This observation is impor-
tant in practice, as we could be under-correcting or over-
correcting inequalities if we assume differences in admission
rates will not vary.
3. POLICY DESIGN
To reduce admission rate gaps, we consider the use of bonus
policies, which award bonus points to students from disad-
vantaged groups.
Problem definition. We wish our admission policy to lead
to the admission of the students with the highest scores,
and to a reduction in admission rate disparities. We thus
define the objective function of the bonus policy as a linear
combination of both the equality of admission rates, i.e., the
SPD, and utility, i.e., the scores of the accepted students.
We measure utility µb as the average score of the students
who are admitted when b bonus points are given. As utility
might vary strongly between application sets, we calculate
the loss of µb compared to µ0, i.e. the utility when no bonus
policy is implemented.
ob = (µ0 − µb) + λ · |SPDb|, λ ≥ 0. (2)
The optimization is executed by finding the optimal bonus
policy for multiple application sets, which are forecasts of
potential applicants and their preferences based on histori-
cal data. The optimal bonus for a single application set is
determined by applying a range of bonus points and directly
measuring the objective function. The output of this pro-
cedure is simply the average of the optimal bonuses over all
application sets that are evaluated. The strategies we con-
sider next either sample application sets from a statistical
model learned from historical data; or optimize directly on
historical data.
Application sets generated by a predictive model.
We build a multi-label probabilistic classifier to model stu-
dents’ application behavior. To predict applications for 2017,
we train the model on data from the at the time most re-
cent year, i.e., 2016. We deploy the trained model to create
n possible application sets. Each application set consists of
a sampled set of students together with their predicted pro-
gram preferences. We experiment with n = 50 and n = 200
sampled application sets to evaluate possible bonus policies.
Baseline: directly use historical data. A simpler ap-
proach is to compute what bonus policy would have been
optimal in previous years. Such an approach has the dis-
advantage that we are limited to the number of years for
which we have data for the program that we want to design
a policy for. Nevertheless, we also include this approach in
our empirical evaluation as a baseline.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We compare strategies based on application sets generated
by a predictive model (50 and 200 application sets) and
strategies that average the (in hindsight) optimal policies
for historical data (1 year, 3 years, and 5 years). We con-
sider two sensitive attributes, gender and income, for the
year 2017. To find an appropriate value for λ in Eq. 2, we
calculate the median differences in grades and test scores be-
tween subgroups: 23 points for gender groups and 28 points
for income groups. First, we evaluate the strategies for sug-
gesting policies for all programs and evaluate their overall
effect. Second, we evaluate the strategies when policies are
only applied to programs which show consistent inequalities
in admission rates over time.
All programs. In Table 1, we compare the objective func-
tion values resulting from applying the different strategies
to the ideal objective function values for all programs. In
the table itself, we show the mean and standard distribu-
tion (SD) of this difference for both sensitive attributes. Ta-
ble 1 shows the error in the objective function relative to the
smallest achievable ones, i.e. the values that result from ap-
plying the ideal bonus policies. Note that, based on Table 1,
policies that use more application sets for their suggestions
generally lead to both smaller errors and less variance in the
error.
While optimizing the objective function, it is also impor-
tant to ensure that the gap in admission rates is decreased
compared to when we do not intervene. Note that no in-
tervention (i.e., no bonus, b = 0) is almost guaranteed to
lead to the lowest utility loss, as utility is typically largest
when no affirmative action policy is applied. Table 2 com-
pares the difference in the admission rate gaps, measured as
the absolute value of SPD with and without a bonus policy
b: |SPDb| − |SPD0|. Negative values thus indicate a lower
admission rate gap through the intervention – which is de-
sirable. In general, we can see that the values suggested
through more application sets again exhibit less variance.
The reason for this lies in the nature of the predictive ap-
proach which is more conservative in its suggestions. To see
this, we compare the number of bonus points given to each
program under the different strategies (see Table 3). What
is evident is that the more application sets a strategy bases
its suggestions on, the smaller the proposed bonus values
become and the less variance they show across all programs.
The bonus values suggested by the predictive approaches are
thus closest to 0 and vary the least. The optimal policy in
general gives more bonus points. Even though the strategy
based on last year’s historical data has similar statistics, the
previous analysis has shown that this strategy often per-
forms worse than the other strategies. This underlines the
need for a more conservative design strategy.
Programs with consistent inequalities. We observe in
Table 2 that some design strategies have averages above 0
and that the SDs are large compared to the means. There-
fore, sometimes the strategies increase the gap of admission
rates compared to having no policy – largely due to the un-
predictability of admission rates (see Section 2).
In practice, affirmative action policies should not be de-
ployed for all programs, but only sparingly for programs
that have consistently unequal admission rates. Hence, we
consider programs that (i) have unequal admission rates in
each of the three most recent years, where (ii) the admis-
sion rate is always lower for the same subgroup, and (iii)
the differences are above 0.1, i.e., strong differences, for at
least two out of the three years. This results in 12 programs
to which a gender policy is applicable and 29 programs for
income policies. This means that income tends to gener-
ate more consistent and stronger admission rate disparities
than gender. Anecdotally, we note that programs with con-
sistent inequalities tend to be large programs with many
high-scoring applicants, such as medicine or engineering.
Table 1 and 2 include the values for the filtered programs in
the columns on the right. The findings are similar to what
we had previously observed for all programs. The predic-
tive policy suggestions again exhibit lower variance with the
exception of the income policies.
In general, we note that strategies based on predictive mod-
els are less likely to harm an underrepresented group in cases
where we observe “flips” in the underrepresentation that
sometimes happen from one year to the next one. These
changes can to some extent, but not entirely, be anticipated
and addressed with more conservative policy suggestions.
Table 1: Error in objective function relative to ideal policies. Smaller values are better.
All programs Consistently unequal
Gender Income Gender Income
Strategy Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Historical - 1 year 0.37 1.11 0.44 1.31 1.31 1.88 1.79 1.63
Historical - 3 years 0.30 0.94 0.34 1.06 1.02 1.81 1.36 1.62
Historical - 5 years 0.32 0.99 0.33 0.98 1.22 1.20 1.63 1.57
Predictive - 50 sets 0.28 0.90 0.37 1.13 0.84 1.16 2.28 2.12
Predictive - 200 sets 0.29 0.90 0.36 1.11 0.91 1.15 2.14 1.97
Table 2: Difference in absolute SPD relative to no intervention. Lower values are better.
All programs Consistently unequal
Gender Income Gender Income
Strategy Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Historical - 1 year 0.0014 0.0339 -0.0013 0.0383 0.0028 0.0922 -0.0774 0.1000
Historical - 3 years -0.0005 0.0269 -0.0034 0.0266 -0.0153 0.1069 0.0983 0.0704
Historical - 5 years 0.0005 0.0234 -0.0037 0.0270 -0.0037 0.0858 -0.0849 0.0827
Predictive - 50 sets -0.0003 0.0124 -0.0020 0.0210 -0.0156 0.0586 -0.0625 0.0822
Predictive - 200 sets -0.0002 0.0126 -0.0023 0.0215 -0.0135 0.0575 -0.0670 0.0817
Table 3: Comparison of the number of bonus points given
by different strategies.
Gender Income
Strategy Mean SD Mean SD
Historical - 1 year 2.31 6.33 2.49 6.49
Historical - 3 years 1.85 4.06 1.90 4.58
Historical - 5 years 1.50 3.25 1.77 4.28
Predictive - 50 sets 0.97 2.70 1.25 3.96
Predictive - 200 sets 0.95 2.66 1.24 3.94
Ideal 1.76 6.24 2.21 6.78
5. CONCLUSIONS
We compared a predictive approach to simpler design strate-
gies based on averaging retrospectively optimal bonuses over
1-5 years of historical data. The latter are more likely to
over-correct the differences in admission rates. Our pro-
posed predictive approach mostly avoids this pitfall through
more conservative suggestions. In practice, while the pre-
dictive strategy tends to be more robust than the simpler
approaches, a simpler approach based on sufficient historical
data (e.g., the last five years) might in practice be preferable.
Predictive methods are, however, advantageous if historical
data is only available for a few years or if only aggregate
statistics are accessible.
An aspect that is left for future research is the effect of the
announcement of affirmative action policies on the applica-
tion behavior. Existing research (see, e.g., [3, 7, 13]) suggests
that the mere existence of affirmative action policies might
encourage students from disadvantaged groups to apply. It
is therefore imaginable that less bonus points may suffice
to achieve the desired effect: one more reason for preferring
conservative strategies.
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